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titlefeat(ai): JWT-claim-driven multi-tenant isolation for Memory Core (#10000)
authortobiu
stateMerged
createdAtApr 20, 2026, 4:12 PM
updatedAtApr 20, 2026, 5:08 PM
closedAtApr 20, 2026, 5:08 PM
mergedAtApr 20, 2026, 5:08 PM
branchesdev ← agent/10000-jwt-claim-identity
urlhttps://github.com/neomjs/neo/pull/10128
Merged
tobiu
tobiu commented on Apr 20, 2026, 4:12 PM

Summary

Establishes end-to-end tenant isolation for the Memory Core. Every ChromaDB write tags the authenticated user's userId; every ChromaDB read filters with where: {userId}. The identity source of truth is the OIDC-validated Bearer token (via AuthService's introspection response), propagated through the async call chain via a new RequestContextService singleton wrapping Node.js AsyncLocalStorage. In stdio transport mode no request context is active — writes skip the tag, reads skip the filter, legacy single-tenant behavior preserved.

Core safety claim: two users with distinct userId claims writing into the same sessionId each see only their own memories on subsequent read.

Pattern deviation from ticket body (Pattern A chosen over Pattern B)

The ticket's task 1 prescribes extracting identity from "trusted reverse-proxy HTTP headers (e.g., x-auth-request-preferred-username)" — Pattern B, trust the reverse proxy. This PR implements Pattern A: extract identity from the OIDC token's preferred_username / sub claim inside AuthService.verifyAccessToken, served as the authoritative source.

Rationale: Pattern A is self-contained defense-in-depth — Memory Core validates identity from its own OAuth 2.1 source rather than trusting infrastructure configuration. Both paths need the same request-context plumbing, so Pattern A's cost is just the claim extraction in the verifier (~10 lines). Documented in RequestContextService + AuthService JSDoc so future operators understand the trust model.

Deployments behind oauth2-proxy still work — oauth2-proxy forwards the Bearer token, MC validates it independently, Memory Core's claim extraction wins. Both layers coexist; no conflict.

Scope

File Change
ai/mcp/server/shared/services/AuthService.mjs Extend verifyAccessToken to extract userId (preferred_username || sub) and username (preferred_username || name || email || sub) from introspection response. Expanded class Anchor documents the identity-propagation contract.
ai/mcp/server/shared/services/RequestContextService.mjs New. Neo singleton wrapping Node AsyncLocalStorage. Exposes run(context, callback), get(), getUserId(), getUsername(). Cross-cutting identity propagation without polluting service signatures.
ai/mcp/server/shared/services/TransportService.mjs Wrap app.all('/mcp') handler in RequestContextService.run({userId, username}, () => transport.handleRequest(...)). Bridges Express req.auth context to the MCP dispatch async chain.
ai/mcp/server/memory-core/services/MemoryService.mjs addMemory tags metadata.userId. listMemories, queryMemories, getContextFrontier, preBriefSession apply where: {userId} — the graph-bridged summary fetches in the last two close a defense-in-depth gap until #10011 isolates the SQLite graph itself.
ai/mcp/server/memory-core/services/SummaryService.mjs listSummaries, querySummaries filter by userId. deleteAllSummaries switches from global collection.drop() to tenant-scoped collection.delete({where: {userId}}) in cloud mode — prevents one tenant wiping another's data. stdio mode retains legacy drop+recreate behavior.
ai/mcp/server/memory-core/services/SessionService.mjs Summary upsert + Antigravity implementation-plan upsert both tag metadata.userId when a request context is active.
test/playwright/unit/ai/mcp/server/shared/services/RequestContextService.spec.mjs New. 6 unit tests covering: default-undefined posture, run() scoping, no leak after run(), async-boundary survival, nested-context unwind, concurrent-isolation guarantee.
test/playwright/unit/ai/mcp/server/memory-core/services/MemoryService.TenantIsolation.spec.mjs New. 6 integration tests with a spy-collection stub of StorageRouter.getMemoryCollection. Asserts write tags + read filters for both cloud (with context) and stdio (no context) paths. Includes the end-to-end cross-tenant assertion (alice + bob write to same sessionId, each reads back only their own).

Architectural reality captured in JSDoc

  • RequestContextService class Anchor: identity flow diagram from AuthService.verifyAccessToken → TransportService.run → service consumption, with the explicit stdio-mode fallback contract
  • AuthService class Anchor: extended with the Identity Propagation section cross-referencing RequestContextService
  • MemoryService + SummaryService class Anchors: tenant-isolation section noting the #10010 team-vs-private toggle that will later ride on top
  • Inline comments at every tag/filter call site referencing ticket #10000 and the substrate (AsyncLocalStorage / stdio fallback / defense-in-depth rationale)

Test plan

  • RequestContextService.spec.mjs — 6/6 passing in isolation
  • MemoryService.TenantIsolation.spec.mjs — 6/6 passing in isolation (including the cross-tenant alice-vs-bob assertion)
  • Full memory-core/ + shared/ suite — 33 passed, 11 failed; all 11 failures reproduce on baseline or pass in isolation (see below)

Baseline failure accounting

Pre-existing suite failures carried over unchanged from the #10001 → #10007 → #10124 chain:

  • 2 × description-length / path-pattern asserts (McpServerToolLimits, FileSystemIngestor)
  • 5 × SessionSummarization failing on aiConfig.engines.neo.* — tracked in #10126
  • 4 × fullyParallel interleaving flake in GraphService.spec + QueryReRanker.spec — 15/15 pass when the two specs run in isolation, confirming the flake is cross-singleton state leakage (tracked by the symmetric_spec_cleanup feedback memory)

Net: zero new failures introduced by this PR.

Backward compatibility

  • stdio transport (local agent dev workflow): no middleware runs, RequestContextService.getUserId() returns undefined, every tag + filter call site degrades to legacy unfiltered single-tenant behavior. Explicit stdio fallback comment at each call site. Existing SessionSummarization + concurrent-collection tests (when they otherwise pass) continue unchanged.
  • SSE transport without OIDC: no AuthService.setup, no requireBearerAuth middleware, req.auth is undefined, context object has undefined userId — identical fallback.
  • SSE transport with OIDC: the only mode where isolation activates. Identity flows from claim → context → service.

Out of scope (separate tickets)

  • #10010 team-vs-private read flag — operator-facing toggle that keeps writes tagged but skips the read filter. Rides cleanly on top of this PR — just gates the where.userId assignment.
  • #10011 Native Edge Graph row-level security — the getContextFrontier / preBriefSession defense-in-depth added here is a mitigation until #10011 lands the real isolation at the graph layer. Documented inline.
  • Exhaustive per-service integration tests beyond MemoryService.TenantIsolation.spec.mjs. Equivalent spy-collection pattern extends naturally to SummaryService and SessionService; filing as a polish follow-up rather than bloating this PR's reviewable surface.
  • #10126 engines.neo fix and the other pre-existing baseline failures. Not this PR's concern.

What this unblocks

Combined with #10001 (PR #10121) + #10007 (PR #10123) + #10124 (scrub), the multi-tenant Memory Core cloud deployment target now has:

  1. Topology toggle (NEO_CHROMA_UNIFIED, #10001)
  2. Lifecycle bypass in unified mode (#10007)
  3. Identity propagation + per-tenant ChromaDB isolation (this PR, #10000)

The remaining hard blocker for the deployment is #10010 (team-vs-private read-flag toggle); an engineering team wanting team-shared memory needs that switch to skip the default-deny read filter while keeping writes tagged.

Resolves #10000

Origin Session ID: 1c001810-be28-4554-bb56-c98f9b91bbfb

tobiu
tobiu commented on Apr 20, 2026, 4:38 PM

Input from Claude Opus 4.7 (Claude Code):

❋ ## PR Review Summary

Status: Approved

Self-Review Opening: Self-review of #10000. This implementation chose Pattern A (OIDC-claim-driven identity) over the ticket's Pattern B (reverse-proxy header), established a new shared primitive (RequestContextService via AsyncLocalStorage), and shipped the full write-tag + read-filter + tenant-safe-delete surface as one cohesive PR rather than splitting to avoid a tagged-but-unprotected intermediate state. Key trade-offs and gaps noted below — harsher on Execution-Quality for an identified test-coverage gap in the SummaryService + SessionService write paths.

📊 Evaluation Metrics

  • [ARCH_ALIGNMENT]: 92 — Shared concern extracted to shared/services/ (correct namespace). AsyncLocalStorage is the standard Node primitive for this, chosen over explicit parameter threading to avoid polluting service signatures. Dual-point defense-in-depth (automatic TransportService middleware + method-level RequestContextService.getUserId() at every service call site) repeats the #10007 pattern. Minor: the defense-in-depth filters in getContextFrontier / preBriefSession silently reduce cross-tenant leaks to zero-row returns without a forensic log signal — a logger.debug when userId is set AND zero docs returned would help operators diagnose tenant misattribution. Polish.
  • [CONTENT_COMPLETENESS]: 93 — Class Anchors on all 6 modified services carry a Multi-tenant isolation section cross-referencing RequestContextService and ticket #10000. The new RequestContextService has the richest Anchor in the PR — identity flow diagram, rationale for AsyncLocalStorage vs parameter threading, rationale for OIDC claims vs reverse-proxy header, stdio-mode fallback contract. Inline comments at every tag/filter call site reference #10000 and name the substrate. Deferred: learn/agentos/MemoryCore.md docs pass (same rationale as #10001/#10007 — wait for the full multi-tenant story including #10010 before the prose update); learn/agentos/Authorization.md could reference the new userId / username verifier-return fields — small operator-doc gap.
  • [EXECUTION_QUALITY]: 85 — 12/12 new tests pass. The cross-tenant assertion in MemoryService.TenantIsolation.spec.mjs (alice writes 2, bob writes 1, each reads back only own) is the load-bearing security claim and it's covered explicitly. Symmetric beforeEach/afterEach restore discipline. Gap: the tenant-scoped SummaryService.deleteAllSummaries cloud-mode path has no explicit test — it's a destructive + new behavior and deserves its own coverage. Same spy-collection pattern extends trivially. Likewise SessionService.summarizeSessions userId tagging. Out-of-scope note in PR body is honest but these are the two call sites where absence of test coverage actually matters.
  • [PRODUCTIVITY]: 96 — All 3 ticket tasks delivered plus one security bonus (tenant-scoped deleteAllSummaries — the ticket didn't explicitly name this, but leaving it at collection.drop() would have let any tenant wipe the whole multi-user deployment). Pattern deviation (A vs B) is documented with rationale; no secret scope cuts.
  • [IMPACT]: 85 — This PR is the multi-tenant enabler. Without it, the #10001 + #10007 topology work is just "co-located KB+MC on one box with no isolation." Strategic impact is high; immediate runtime impact is partially gated by #10010 (a team wanting shared-team-reads needs that toggle before the full deployment story is complete).
  • [COMPLEXITY]: 60 — 8 files, +623 / −51, one new shared primitive (RequestContextService), cross-cutting concern threaded through 3 services. Substantial surface area but well-organized — the dual-point defense pattern from #10007 + Anchor & Echo JSDoc make the flow traceable.
  • [EFFORT_PROFILE]: Architectural Pillar — introduces new shared infrastructure that future cross-cutting concerns (rate limiting, request-scoped audit logging, tenant-scoped feature flags) can compose onto. Delivers the load-bearing security guarantee for the multi-tenant deployment target. Establishes the substrate for #10010's read-flag toggle.

🕸️ Context & Graph Linking

  • Target Epic / Issue ID: Resolves #10000
  • Related Graph Nodes: Epic #9999 (Cloud-Native Knowledge & Multi-Tenant Memory Core); sub-epic #10016 (Multi-Tenant Identity & Data Privacy) — this PR is the first landed sub-ticket in that sub-epic; sub-epic #10015 (Dynamic Topology — complete via #10001 + #10007); upcoming sub-ticket #10010 (team-vs-private read flag) and #10011 (SQLite RLS); defense-in-depth filter in getContextFrontier / preBriefSession is an explicit mitigation until #10011 lands

🧠 Graph Ingestion Notes

  • [TOOLING_GAP]: AsyncLocalStorage-based integration tests require careful beforeEach/afterEach restoration to avoid contaminating sibling specs via the shared singleton. The symmetric-cleanup pattern per feedback_symmetric_spec_cleanup.md works but duplicates setup boilerplate across each new tenant-isolation spec. A test helper (e.g. withRequestContext(ctx, fn) plus a withSpyCollection(service) factory) would reduce duplication as more services gain tenant-isolation coverage. Minor; worth filing if the pattern spreads to three or more specs.

  • [RETROSPECTIVE]: Three patterns worth permanent capture:

    1. AsyncLocalStorage for cross-cutting request state. Standard Node.js primitive that was underused in the codebase before this PR. RequestContextService establishes the canonical pattern — future cross-cutting concerns (rate limiting per userId, request-scoped audit logging, tenant-scoped feature flags, trace IDs) can compose onto the same context object without churn at each service call site. Documented contract: middleware sets, services read, stdio-mode fallback via undefined.

    2. Dual-point defense-in-depth generalizes across infrastructure-boundary features. #10007 established this at the lifecycle boundary (initAsync + startDatabase both guarded); #10000 repeats at the identity boundary (TransportService middleware + every service-level tag/filter call site). Emerging rule: when a feature has both an automatic entry point AND a manual MCP-tool-exposed entry point, guard at BOTH layers. Encodes the lesson that automatic-only guards miss operator-initiated paths; method-level-only guards miss race conditions during init.

    3. Quality-over-speed recalibration catches architectural gaps pre-implementation. The initial reflex was Pattern B (ticket's prescription) + write-side-only split. The pause-to-analyze discipline caught: (a) Pattern B trusts infrastructure when Pattern A has the same plumbing cost with self-contained validation, (b) a write-tag-without-read-filter split would create a tagged-but-unprotected intermediate state (data classified but not isolated — strictly worse than current baseline), (c) cohesive single PR is cleaner despite larger diff. Generalization: pause-to-analyze the prescribed prescription when "quick win" reflex is fighting with "this changes the architecture" reality. Encoded as the feedback_quality_over_speed.md memory saved this session.

📋 Required Actions

No blocking changes. Three optional items — two polish commits worth pushing pre-merge if you want them locked in, one deferred-doc follow-up.

  • (Polish) Add explicit test coverage for SummaryService.deleteAllSummaries tenant-scoped cloud-mode path. Destructive + new behavior; deserves its own assertion. Same spy-collection pattern extends naturally.
  • (Polish) Add explicit test coverage for SessionService.summarizeSessions userId tagging on the summary upsert + Antigravity plan upsert. Write-path-specific.
  • (Follow-up, not this PR) learn/agentos/Authorization.md — reference the new userId / username verifier-return fields so operators configuring OIDC know what downstream services can read. Can land alongside the MemoryCore.md multi-tenant docs pass when #10010 completes.

Approved for merge. Next in sequence: #10010 (team-vs-private read flag) to complete the multi-tenant deployment path, then tobi's call on whether to file the three polish items as a follow-up or push them here.

tobiu
tobiu commented on Apr 20, 2026, 5:06 PM

Input from Claude Opus 4.7 (Claude Code):

❋ Pre-polish safety work + partial polish landed per @tobiu's direction.

Safety backup before touching destructive paths

Ran node buildScripts/ai/exportDatabase.mjs before any test work. Exported 8191 memories + 794 summaries + 15 graph elements to .neo-ai-data/backups/. Full re-summarization would have been the recovery cost if a spec error had nuked production data — so the backup is the load-bearing safety net behind this polish pass.

Follow-up ticket filed

#10129 — exportDatabase.mjs: route via services.mjs SDK + cover Knowledge Base. The current script has two gaps surfaced by the backup run: direct ai/mcp/server/... imports bypass the ai/services.mjs Zod-validated SDK boundary, and only Memory Core is covered — Knowledge Base has no manageDatabaseBackup surface at all. Two-phase implementation plan documented in the ticket.

78b13a300 — SummaryService tenant-isolation spec

New test/playwright/unit/ai/mcp/server/memory-core/services/SummaryService.TenantIsolation.spec.mjs — 6 tests, spy-collection pattern, zero real-DB contact (explicitly called out in the spec's top JSDoc). Covers:

  • deleteAllSummaries cloud-mode scopes to active tenant — the load-bearing assertion: collection.drop() is NOT called, collection.delete({where: {userId}}) is. Seeded with 2 Alice + 3 Bob summaries; Alice's delete leaves all 3 of Bob's intact.
  • deleteAllSummaries stdio-mode preserves legacy drop() + recreate path (single-tenant backward-compat).
  • deleteAllSummaries cloud-mode with zero tenant rows skips the delete call entirely (no-op round-trip elimination).
  • listSummaries filters by userId from request context.
  • querySummaries merges userId with caller-provided category filter.
  • querySummaries without a request context leaves the caller-provided where as-is.

SessionService polish — deferred

The SessionService.summarizeSessions + ingestAntigravityArtifacts userId-tagging test requires mocking this.memoryCollection + this.sessionsCollection + this.model.generateContent + GraphService + fs.readdirSync / fs.readFileSync — substantial test-machinery scope that would bloat this polish commit. Cleaner path is a small refactor extracting the metadata-construction into a pure buildSummaryMetadata(...) / buildPlanMetadata(...) helper, then unit-testing the helper directly.

That refactor adds real value (testability + reuse) beyond just enabling the test, so it belongs as its own ticket rather than inline in this PR. Happy to file if you want it queued; flagging rather than auto-filing since it's borderline between "legitimate follow-up" and "test-coverage-only scope" and your call wins.

Authorization.md doc reference

Deferred to the consolidated MemoryCore.md + Authorization.md multi-tenant docs pass that rides alongside #10010's completion — same rationale as the #10001 / #10007 doc deferrals (avoid partial-feature prose drift).

Cumulative state

Two commits on PR:

  • 8265e3be5 — feat(ai): JWT-claim-driven multi-tenant isolation for Memory Core (#10000)
  • 78b13a300 — test(ai): add tenant isolation spec for SummaryService (#10000)

18 tests total passing (6 RequestContextService + 6 MemoryService.TenantIsolation + 6 SummaryService.TenantIsolation). Zero new suite failures.