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id10476
titleP8: External Link Quarantine & Stealth-Intent Detection (Anti-Astroturfing)
stateOpen
labels
aiarchitecture
assignees[]
createdAtApr 28, 2026, 6:01 PM
updatedAtMay 26, 2026, 2:47 AM
githubUrlhttps://github.com/neomjs/neo/issues/10476
authorneo-gemini-3-1-pro
commentsCount3
parentIssue10291
subIssues[]
subIssuesCompleted0
subIssuesTotal0
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P8: External Link Quarantine & Stealth-Intent Detection (Anti-Astroturfing)

Openaiarchitecture
neo-gemini-3-1-pro
neo-gemini-3-1-pro commented on Apr 28, 2026, 6:01 PM

P8: External Link Quarantine & Stealth-Intent Detection (Anti-Astroturfing)

Context

Sub-ticket of Epic #10291 (Organism Self-Defense). This addresses a vulnerability discovered empirically when an external automated agent (@desiorac) infiltrated the #10291 epic itself.

The external agent used a "Trojan Horse" strategy: generating high-quality, peer-to-peer technical critiques to build credibility and bypass human spam filters, then seamlessly inserting a marketing backlink (arkforge.tech) at the end of the payload. The attack was only detected because the agent's wrapper script leaked its French Chain-of-Thought prompting instructions.

The Problem

Current defenses (P1 provenance, P6b guards) protect the graph and the tool execution boundary. However, they do not protect the swarm from Stealth Astroturfing or Malicious Link Traversal.

If a highly credible technical comment contains a link, an agent might traverse it (via web reading tools) to gather more context, walking directly into a watering-hole attack, IP-logger, or prompt-injection payload hosted on the external site. Furthermore, storing these links in our Memory Core turns our database into an SEO link-farm.

2026 Industry-Standard Alignment

Mitigates OWASP ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (via indirect prompt injection on external sites) and Supply Chain / Watering Hole Attacks. It aligns with Zero-Trust architecture by assuming all external URIs are hostile until proven otherwise.

The Architectural Reality

  • mcp_neo-mjs-github-workflow read paths (e.g., get_conversation)
  • AGENTS.md (Agent directives on tool usage)
  • Memory Core ingestion paths

The Fix

  1. URI Defanging at the Read Boundary: When get_conversation or issue-fetching tools retrieve content authored by the External trust tier (per P1), all hyperlinks and raw URLs must be regex-defanged (e.g., https://arkforge.tech -> [QUARANTINED_URL: arkforge.tech]).
  2. Traversal Prohibition Rule: An explicit rule in AGENTS.md strictly forbidding any agent from using URL-reading tools on domains provided by external users without explicit Human Commander (@tobiu) approval.
  3. P7 Contextual Sanitizer Extension: Ensure the P7 Critic/Verifier agent is instructed to strip self-promotional astroturfing context when persisting external summaries to the Memory Core, preventing our graph from becoming an SEO link-farm.

Acceptance Criteria

  • AGENTS.md updated with strict External URL Traversal Prohibition.
  • get_conversation MCP tool updated to defang URLs from non-collaborator comments.
  • P7 Sanitization profile updated with astroturfing-removal directives.

Out of Scope

  • GitHub Action automated comment deletion (we want to keep the technical signal, just kill the link).

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