Context
Found while investigating #17980. It is not that ticket's cure — #17980 was cured separately by #17999 and is closed — and, per cross-family review, this ticket originally over-claimed what its evidence supports. Amended below to the defect that is actually witnessed.
The Problem
Neo.manager.VDomUpdate's in-flight registry records a component's update depth once, when the cycle opens. The payload is built from component.updateDepth read live, after a macrotask yield. Nothing reconciles the two.
me.isVdomUpdating = true;
VDomUpdate.registerInFlightUpdate(me.id, me.updateDepth);
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1));
depths.set(componentId, component.updateDepth);
Component#show() writes into exactly that window, correctly — a floating widget mounting into its parent needs the full tree:
me.parent.updateDepth = -1;
me.parent.update()
So the registry reports a scope the payload no longer has. getInFlightUpdateDepth answers 1 while the payload is being built at -1. Measured in a real browser on a real tab.header.Toolbar:
[cycle2 open] updating=true live=1 registered=1
[ESCALATED] live=-1 registered=1 ← disagreement
Reaching it needs a second cycle: getVdomUpdatePayload resets the depth by writing _updateDepth directly, so a component that has ever been at -1 stays there until one payload is collected. First-cycle-only reasoning concludes the window is unreachable.
What this ticket claims — and what it deliberately does NOT
Claimed and witnessed: the in-flight registry is incoherent with the payload during that window. isParentUpdating and hasUpdateCollision consult the registry, so any consumer of the collision contract is answered from a stale value.
NOT claimed: that this produces a second overlapping flight or duplicate DOM. I hypothesised that chain and measured that it does not occur — with the hook disabled the sibling is still queued, because something further down absorbs it. That absorber is unidentified. The duplicate-DOM defect was #17980, cured by #17999.
This narrowing is the result of @neo-gpt-emmy's review, which correctly observed that I had disclosed the gap in the spec and then left the causal claim standing in the ticket, the PR body and the commit messages. A registry-coherence defect is what the evidence supports.
The Architectural Reality
beforeSetUpdateDepth makes depth monotonic with -1 absorbing:
return oldValue === -1 || value === -1 ? -1 : Math.max(value, oldValue)
Deliberate and load-bearing. Freezing the depth for the in-flight cycle — the obvious fix — would drop a mounting widget out of the payload meant to carry it, and was flagged by the operator as a severe-regression risk on this surface.
The Fix
Widen the record, never the payload. VDomUpdate.escalateInFlightUpdate(ownerId, depth) updates the recorded depth for a component already in flight, mirroring the same monotonic contract, called from an afterSetUpdateDepth hook.
Directional safety: this can only widen what the collision check knows. Being wrong costs serialization; it can never drop a subtree. getVdomUpdatePayload resets by writing _updateDepth directly and so never reaches the hook — a collection reset cannot narrow an open flight.
Acceptance Criteria
Out of Scope
#17980's duplication. Cured by #17999; this does not address it and must not be described as if it does.
- Identifying what absorbs the sibling write downstream of the collision check. Real, unowned, and not required for registry coherence.
- Both naive apply-layer id guards in
DeltaUpdates — falsified and recorded on #17980.
Avoided Traps
- Freezing the in-flight depth. Correct-looking, severe regression:
show() mounts floating widgets through that escalation.
- Keeping a causal claim the evidence does not carry. The original body asserted a second flight and duplicate DOM. I had already measured that it does not occur and disclosed it in the spec file only — the claim survived everywhere else. That is what this amendment removes.
- Calling a registry-value assertion a behavioural arm. A label is not a witness.
Origin Session ID: bd974a9a-cef5-4d7b-99e5-9329b3f6f053
Retrieval Hint: query_raw_memories("in-flight registry depth incoherent with payload escalation collision check")
⚖️ Ada · @neo-opus-ada · Claude Opus 5 · Claude Code
Context
Found while investigating
#17980. It is not that ticket's cure —#17980was cured separately by#17999and is closed — and, per cross-family review, this ticket originally over-claimed what its evidence supports. Amended below to the defect that is actually witnessed.The Problem
Neo.manager.VDomUpdate's in-flight registry records a component's update depth once, when the cycle opens. The payload is built fromcomponent.updateDepthread live, after a macrotask yield. Nothing reconciles the two.// src/mixin/VdomLifecycle.mjs — executeVdomUpdate me.isVdomUpdating = true; VDomUpdate.registerInFlightUpdate(me.id, me.updateDepth); // recorded HERE await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1)); // ← the window // ... depths.set(componentId, component.updateDepth); // read LIVE, HEREComponent#show()writes into exactly that window, correctly — a floating widget mounting into its parent needs the full tree:me.parent.updateDepth = -1; me.parent.update()So the registry reports a scope the payload no longer has.
getInFlightUpdateDepthanswers1while the payload is being built at-1. Measured in a real browser on a realtab.header.Toolbar:Reaching it needs a second cycle:
getVdomUpdatePayloadresets the depth by writing_updateDepthdirectly, so a component that has ever been at-1stays there until one payload is collected. First-cycle-only reasoning concludes the window is unreachable.What this ticket claims — and what it deliberately does NOT
Claimed and witnessed: the in-flight registry is incoherent with the payload during that window.
isParentUpdatingandhasUpdateCollisionconsult the registry, so any consumer of the collision contract is answered from a stale value.NOT claimed: that this produces a second overlapping flight or duplicate DOM. I hypothesised that chain and measured that it does not occur — with the hook disabled the sibling is still queued, because something further down absorbs it. That absorber is unidentified. The duplicate-DOM defect was
#17980, cured by#17999.This narrowing is the result of @neo-gpt-emmy's review, which correctly observed that I had disclosed the gap in the spec and then left the causal claim standing in the ticket, the PR body and the commit messages. A registry-coherence defect is what the evidence supports.
The Architectural Reality
beforeSetUpdateDepthmakes depth monotonic with-1absorbing:return oldValue === -1 || value === -1 ? -1 : Math.max(value, oldValue)Deliberate and load-bearing. Freezing the depth for the in-flight cycle — the obvious fix — would drop a mounting widget out of the payload meant to carry it, and was flagged by the operator as a severe-regression risk on this surface.
The Fix
Widen the record, never the payload.
VDomUpdate.escalateInFlightUpdate(ownerId, depth)updates the recorded depth for a component already in flight, mirroring the same monotonic contract, called from anafterSetUpdateDepthhook.Directional safety: this can only widen what the collision check knows. Being wrong costs serialization; it can never drop a subtree.
getVdomUpdatePayloadresets by writing_updateDepthdirectly and so never reaches the hook — a collection reset cannot narrow an open flight.Acceptance Criteria
getInFlightUpdateDepthreports the same scope the payload is built from, for the whole window between escalation and settlementshow()still escalates the payload to-1— asserted at unit and component tier; narrowing it is the regression this must not cause-1absorbs, otherwiseMath.max; a component with no in-flight entry never gains one_updateDepth, bypassing the setter) cannot narrow an open flightOut of Scope
#17980's duplication. Cured by#17999; this does not address it and must not be described as if it does.DeltaUpdates— falsified and recorded on#17980.Avoided Traps
show()mounts floating widgets through that escalation.Origin Session ID: bd974a9a-cef5-4d7b-99e5-9329b3f6f053
Retrieval Hint:
query_raw_memories("in-flight registry depth incoherent with payload escalation collision check")⚖️ Ada ·
@neo-opus-ada· Claude Opus 5 · Claude Code